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Abstract
In energy meteorology research, scientists from several domains such as
physics, meteorology and electrical engineering work together to obtain
information needed to characterize energy production from regenera-
tive energy sources such as wind and solar power. For this purpose,
several scientific applications were developed to process large data sets
from heterogenous data sources in complex and sometimes long-running
process chains. In our project WISENT a Grid infrastructure is cre-
ated to speed up execution of these applications and to ease access to
computational and data resources. To achieve this goal, Grid software
such as Globus Toolkit and Condor is employed to connect the existing
resources of each project partner. But this ongoing process is hindered
by blocking firewalls due to strong security policies and by the use of
network address translation (NAT). In this paper we describe the cur-
rent Grid architecture and focus on problems that occurred due to the
use of firewalls and NAT. We contribute our present solutions and also
discuss alternative solution ideas. One solution using the so-called “hole
punching” technology is described in more detail.
1 Introduction
In the project WISENT (Knowledge Network Energy Meteorology, wisent.d-
grid.de) [H+06], funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Re-
search (BMBF, www.bmbf.de), six project partners work together to improve
processes and applications in the domain of energy meteorology. These partners
are the OFFIS Institute for Information Technology, the Energy and Semicon-
ductor Research Laboratory (EHF) of the University of Oldenburg, three insti-
tutes of the German Aerospace Center (DLR-TT, DLR-IPA, DLR-DFD) and the
commercial partner Meteocontrol. One part of the collaboration relies on the
sharing of distributed resources to gain common access to computing resources
and large, distributed, and heterogenous data sources. These resources are con-
nected via Grid technologies such as Globus Toolkit 4 (GT4) [GT4] and Condor
[Con]. Unfortunately, the construction of this Grid infrastructure is hindered by
blocking firewalls due to strong firewall policies and by the use of network address
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translation (NAT), also known as masquerading. Thus, project partners’ Grid
middleware installations cannot communicate without restrictions. We consider
several approaches to cope with this problem. One approach utilizes the so-
called “hole punching”, which is a commonly used NAT traversal technique in
peer-to-peer systems [For05]. This technique is also applicable to traverse NAT
system in Grid environments.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the
WISENT Grid architecture. In Section 3 we report on problems with firewalls
and NAT that occurred at the German aerospace center (DLR) during the con-
struction of the Grid infrastructure. Afterwards, we present current or possible
future solutions, including the NAT traversal technique in Section 4. We con-
clude with an outlook on our future work in Section 5.
2 Architecture
Figure 1: Grid infrastructure in WISENT
The WISENT Grid infrastructure is shown in Figure 1. The blue resources
exist at our project partners, and the green resources are available in the German
D-Grid infrastructure. To construct the Grid infrastructure, we have chosen a
bottom-up approach. First, all Grid resources within the internal network of
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each project partner are connected or prepared for external connection. Af-
terwards, the obtained six separate networks are connected together to form
the planned Grid infrastructure, which is also called a Community Grid. The
last step consists of integrating with the German D-Grid infrastructure, where
D-Grid provides a certificate authority (CA) as a basis for a security infrastruc-
ture.
One task for the internal networks is to support compute-intensive applica-
tions with existing CPU resources available at DLR-TT, DLR-IPA and the Uni-
versity of Oldenburg. These resources are a dedicated cluster, several servers,
and desktop PCs. A promising approach comes with Condor, a batch system
designed for using idle CPU cycles (“cycle-scavenging”) of regulars PCs. It is
well-suited for building desktop Grids consisting of regular PCs, in which com-
putations are performed on separate data sets with no message exchange between
distributed processes. Condor jobs are unobtrusive for desktop PC users, as they
are suspended when Condor determines a user’s activity by observing mouse and
keyboard events.
Besides of the already deployed Condor pools, the WISENT project’s further
internal resources consist of a HPC cluster with data storage at OFFIS and
dedicated data storage at DLR-DFD. As recommended by the D-Grid integration
project DGI, we are using the batch system TORQUE [tor] for the HPC cluster
and plan to deploy the data management software dCache [dCa] for the data
storages, excluding the Data Information and Management System (DIMS) at
DLR DFD. The DIMS archive is a tape storage which can be accessed only
through proprietary services supporting data retrieval and post-processing. Its
complex architecture does not permit direct access through dCache.
All Grid resources in the six internal networks are externally connected to
support data transfers and to enable access to external computing resources.
Our project partners are connected using GT4 because of its comprehensive
support for data management and data transfers provided by the GridFTP and
the Reliable File Transfer (RFT) services.
GT4 also offers functionality to access Condor and TORQUE pools via the
resource manager WS-GRAM, deployed as a WSRF Grid service. However, the
access to WS-GRAM differs from Condor and users who are familiar with Condor
have no interest in learning another job description language and further tools.
This problem is solved by Condor-G, which allows Condor jobs to be submitted
to Grid middleware systems such as GT4. Thus, computing resources can be
accessed via WS-GRAM directly or via the Condor-G bridge. The HPC cluster
at OFFIS is accessible through GT4, UNICORE, and gLite, as recommended by
DGI.
3 Problems with firewalls and NAT
As described in Section 2 the WISENT Grid infrastructure mainly relies on
Condor and GT4. We have no firewall or NAT problems when using a Condor
pool at a single location, because no blocking firewalls or a NAT system exist
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between the participating hosts. However, GT4 is deployed in and accessed from
different locations whose networks are protected by firewalls and/or use NAT.
This architecture does not allow unhampered communication and thus a GT4
host cannot be deployed in and accessed from every network. These problems
mainly occur in the DLR network, where multiple strong firewalls exist due to
restrictive security policies and NAT is used.
In a typical firewall configuration all incoming connections are blocked ex-
cept for a few ports belonging to mail or web servers. Outgoing connections,
however, can often pass the firewall unblocked. In some cases, a facility’s net-
work is divided into a so-called “demilitarized zone” (DMZ) and an internal net-
work. Servers that must be reachable from the outside are located in the DMZ.
All other hosts, such as users’ PCs or security relevant systems with company-
internal data, are in the internal network. Incoming connections to the internal
network are usually completely blocked, except for a few explicitly allowed con-
nections from the DMZ. The DLR network is divided in such a DMZ and an
internal network with corresponding firewall policies (Figure 1). DLR-DFD is
additionally protected by an internal firewall, behind which the DIMS archive
is located. Thus, the deployment of GT4 is only possible in the DMZ, as direct
connections to resources in the internal DLR network are not possible.
Another problem with the DLR (DMZ) firewall is caused by the use of so-
called dynamic or ephemeral ports ([Wel06]). These ports typically belong to the
“untrusted”port range (>1024) and are blocked because administrators generally
disapprove of wide port ranges remaining open in the firewall. We are using
two services of GT4 that rely on ephemeral ports, GridFTP and WS-GRAM.
GridFTP uses a static port (2811) for a control channel and multiple ephemeral
ports for data channels. WS-GRAM itself is running on a static port (8443) too,
but ephemeral ports are needed on the client side for file staging and callbacks
during job execution. About 20 ephemeral ports are needed per user in general
[Wel06]. Thus, the port range needed by GT4 grows if many users are working
simultaneously. Fortunately, GT4 offers an option to limit the used range of
ephemeral ports. This option is supported by WS-GRAM and GridFTP and is
already used in the D-Grid infrastructure [VG06].
The main purpose of NAT is to cope with the shortage of globally unique
IP adresses. Hosts in an internal network are assigned IP addresses from a
non-unique, private address range and configured to route their external com-
munication through the NAT system. NAT transparently translates the internal
source IP address and port number contained in an outgoing packet to a single
externally known IP address and associated port numbers. Likewise, the external
destination IP address and port number from an incoming packet is translated
back to the internal pair. This technique is also known as “masquerading” be-
cause it hides the internal IP range from the outside world. A pair consisting of
an IP address and port number is also called an “endpoint”. The role of NAT is
thus translating between private and public endpoints. At any time, the NAT
system maintains a table of sessions, each session representing a translation rule.
A NAT session is established upon receiving an outgoing packet from the inter-
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nal network. It ends after receiving an incoming packet which terminates a TCP
connection or after an idle timeout occurs.
All external traffic to a port number with no valid NAT session is discarded.
This obviously precludes connection attempts to internal hosts from the outside
network. To work around this restriction, most NAT system support static
configuration of public-private endpoint pairs. At DLR this NAT technique is
used for parts of the network, one exception is the DMZ.
The NAT technique conflicts with some properties of GT4 [Wel06]. The Grid
Security Infrastructure (GSI) demands that each GT4 host is directly reachable
through a so-called fully qualified domain name (FQDN), which does not work
with NAT systems. This is not a problem since the GT4 host at DLR is located
in the DMZ with a globally unique IP address and a FQDN. But each connection
attempt from the GT4 host to the internal DLR network is blocked, so internal
batch systems such as Condor are unreachable, which makes job submission
impossible. Furthermore, NAT systems hinder the use of WS-GRAM client’s
full functionality within these networks. When a WS-GRAM client submits
a job to an external WS-GRAM service, it opens an outgoing connection to
the service as well as an additional local ephemeral port for callbacks from the
service. However, the NAT system is unaware of the client’s ephemeral port
and thus rejects callback connections (without NAT, they would be blocked by a
firewall). Thus, the WS-GRAM service and others cannot perform any callbacks
to a client behind a NAT system or firewall.
In summary, connecting distributed Grid resources is challenging due to
strong firewall policies and the use of NAT systems. Workarounds and other
techniques that can be used to cope with the presented problems are described
in the following section.
4 Coping with firewalls and NAT
Initially, we considered the following possible solutions to cope with the fire-
wall problems mentioned in Section 3:
1. An extra “Grid zone” constructed beside the DLR DMZ.
2. A tunnel via virtual private network (VPN) established with each external
project partner.
3. An application level gateway (ALG) used as a transparent proxy.
The first two solutions are very suitable to solve the firewall problems. Yet,
these solutions were rejected because they are associated with additional costs,
such as purchasing extra hardware. Additionally, the creation of a VPN with
each project partner decreases the flexibility of the Grid infrastructure. The
third solution is to place an application level gateway (ALG), a software com-
ponent developed at DLR Sistec, into the DMZ as a transparent proxy between
internally and externally installed Grid software. This is a good approach as
it allows a secure and filtered communication across firewalls. However, each
packet must pass the ALG, which would reduce the throughput of data trans-
fers significantly. Furthermore, the ALG is still under development.
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At this point the last possibility was to place all gateway components—in our
case a host with GT4—into the DMZ. A fixed port range of so-called controllable
ephemeral ports is opened for explicitly named external hosts, so that each
project partner outside the DLR network can access the GridFTP server and
the WS-GRAM service [VG06]. Even then we must cope with the fact that
the gateway cannot directly connect to resources in the internal DLR network
such as data storages and Condor pools. Only outgoing connections in the
other direction are allowed by the internal firewall. Respecting this policy, DLR
currently delivers data products for external partners through a pick-up point in
the DLR DMZ. The requested files can be fetched via a FTP server in this setup.
Requests for data products arrive at a host located in the DLR DMZ. Dedicated
hosts within the internal DLR network retrieve these requests, extract the desired
data product from the DIMS archive and deliver it to the pick-up point. For
technical reasons, it is not possible to substitute this chain completely using Grid
technologies. Thus, our task is to integrate it with Grid components installed in
the DLR DMZ. A similar challenge exists for the WS-GRAM service. At this
moment it is not possible to access any Condor pool in the DLR network via
WS-GRAM in the DLR DMZ due to the firewall restrictions. The solution could
be analogous to the delivery of data products. A job submission with input data
is fetched from the DLR DMZ, forwarded to the Condor pool, and the output
is delivered to the pick-up point. However, external monitoring of job execution
would not be possible using this approach. In general, these approaches for data
delivery and job submission, where only outgoing connections are initiated, can
be extended to further scenarios. For example, each data connection with a
GridFTP server behind a firewall could be initiated by the server itself, if the
application scenario allows it. In this case only outgoing connections are using
ephemeral ports and the port range for incoming connections can remain closed.
This works for GridFTP as long as no parallel data channels are used.
The NAT problem is similar in nature to the firewall problem and permits an
analogous solution: if possible, use only outgoing connections. For example, the
GT4 client can submit jobs without opening a local port for callbacks. Unfor-
tunately, this solution has drawbacks. Job monitoring is then only possible by
fetching the status periodically. Therefore, we consider another approach that
is already used in peer-to-peer systems.
When two peers or hosts are behind a NAT system, they cannot establish
direct communication using just the standard network protocols. A technique
called“hole punching”relies on their ability to communicate with a broker (which
has a globally unique IP address) to establish a direct communication link be-
tween them. The technique establishes a NAT session at each of the two parties
by reusing the public endpoints assigned to the their respective NAT sessions
with the broker S. This technique works with UDP as well as with TCP connec-
tions [For05].
The following simplified example, some technical details are omitted, de-
scribes a typical scenario. Host A and Host B are behind a NAT system and
they cannot communicate directly. However, each host maintains an outgoing
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connection with the broker Host S. Host A and Host B each have a public-private
endpoint session with their NAT systems for the communication with Host S.
Host S itself knows their public endpoints. We assume that the public endpoint
of Host A uses the port 4000 and Host B has one with port 5000. Further used
ports are not essential for understanding this technique and are thus omitted.
If Host A wants to open a connection with Host B the following steps are per-
formed. The step’s numbers correlate with Figure 2. Those port numbers that
are not essential for understanding, are marked with the character string “xxxx”.
1. Host A submits the request for communication with Host B to Host S
2. Host S submits the public endpoint (port 4000) of Host A to Host B.
3. Host B sends a packet via it’s public-private endpoint (port 5000) to the
public endpoint of Host A (4000). The NAT system of Host A rejects
the packet, but a NAT session on B’s side is now established (“a hole is
punched”), ready to translate any packets from A’s public endpoint (port
4000) to B’s public endpoint (port 5000) into B’s corresponding private
endpoint.
4. Host B notifies Host S and awaits an incoming connection from Host A.
5. Host S submits the public endpoint of Host B (port 5000) to Host A.
6. Host A uses its public-private endpoint (port 4000) to establish a connec-
tion with Host B’s public endpoint (port 5000).
Figure 2: Simplified hole punching example
In fact, the hole punching technique has some variants. One problem with
hole punching is that the behavior of NAT systems varies and hole punching
does not work with all of them. A comprehensive study has shown that about
82 percent of NAT systems allow hole punching for UDP and about 64 percent
allow hole punching for TCP [For05]. TCP hole punching is less often supported
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than the UDP counterpart because of the protocol’s additional complexity. The
use of TCP in Grid software increases the risk of incompatibility with NAT sys-
tems. Fortunately, the number of NAT systems supporting both hole punching
techniques is expected to increase.
Another problem is the FQDN requirement mentioned in Section 3. A single
NAT system may be used by several Grid components, deployed on different
machines. In this case, each component’s server certificate would have to contain
the FQDN associated with the external IP address. In principle, this should be
possible, but we have not tested such a scenario yet.
Beside NAT systems, hole punching is also suitable for firewalls that block
incoming connections and allow outgoing connections. When the two hosts in
the scenario above are behind firewalls, this technique is also called dynamic port
configuration. Furthermore, the use of a connection broker itself has additional
benefits. It can be also used for delegating connection initiation when one host
is behind a NAT system or a firewall and the other host is reachable through
a globally unique IP address. For example, the hidden host can open outgoing
data channels for data transfers via GridFTP to the public host. In general, if
allowed by corporate security policies, hole punching is a suitable technology to
use in Grid software across firewalls and NAT systems.
We plan to implement a prototype connection broker to test our existing
firewalls and NAT systems. Afterwards, an exemplary extension for GT4 will
be implemented to use this broker for establishing connections with other hosts
behind NAT systems and firewalls. Naturally, the server must support the GSI
of GT4 for secure connections. An integration with the ALG proxy is possible
as well. At this time, we are not aware of any Grid software that supports hole
punching, even though the technique has been considered before. For example,
the use of UDP hole punching in Grid environments is discussed in [GMNP06].
5 Conclusions and future work
In this paper we described the WISENT Grid architecture and the firewall
and NAT problems encountered during its construction. We introduced different
solutions or workarounds that are employed in our Grid infrastructure or that we
plan to employ. One focus was the use of a connection broker that can be used
for hole punching to traverse firewalls and NAT systems. We plan to implement
such a broker in the future and to test it in our Grid environment.
Today, the Grid technology is not ready for unhindered use across orga-
nizations with strong firewall policies or NAT systems. Especially the use of
ephemeral ports conflicts with the usual firewall configurations and security poli-
cies. Regardless of the approach, Grid middleware must account for firewalls
and NAT to gain wider acceptance. This topic is particularly important for the
adoption of Grid technologies in commercial facilities where the strong firewall
policies and NAT systems are even more common than in academic institutions.
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